Power issues

[Mike1951]

Bottom line as I see it: When HL&P generated power and sent it to HL&P customers over HL&P transmission lines and I paid my bill to HL&P, there were no issues and the service was great.

[Dragonfighter]

Our power has been out twice this morning. I sure hoped that turning off my heat twice, for 45 minutes each time, helped out the power grid situation.

I wonder when Cowboy Stadium will be taken down?

Homeland security exemption, they stayed lit while everyone surrounding them blacked out.

[VMI77]

Bottom line as I see it: When HL&P generated power and sent it to HL&P customers over HL&P transmission lines and I paid my bill to HL&P, there were no issues and the service was great.

That's the way many of us in the industry see it too --at least those of us who work on the reliability side --and some of us fully expect to see continued reductions in reliability, both as a result of the "market" design, and increasing Federal regulatory interference, ironically, in the name of "reliability" (and I say "name" because it's a reliability charade).

[chasfm11]

Bottom line as I see it: When HL&P generated power and sent it to HL&P customers over HL&P transmission lines and I paid my bill to HL&P, there were no issues and the service was great.

That's the way many of us in the industry see it too --at least those of us who work on the reliability side --and some of us fully expect to see continued reductions in reliability, both as a result of the "market" design, and increasing Federal regulatory interference, ironically, in the name of "reliability" (and I say "name" because it's a reliability charade).

Are there any statistics on the deterioration of reliability or have they managed to mangle the way data is collected badly enough under the ERCOT structure that a before/after reliability comparison is impossible? I thought that Texas was pretty much on its own grid. How do the Feds play in the this game? I was ready to blame it all on Texas mismanagement.

I had some first hand experience with one of the power providers. They maintained a very large call center at the time whose major mission seemed to be dealing with their own customers who had been inaccurately disconnected because the billing system couldn't keep account payments straight. It is one thing to loose power under emergency conditions and wholly another thing to have someone yank the meter out of my house when I had paid all my bills on time but they couldn't post them to my account correctly. I cannot imagine how the Feds would be involved in that but what do I know?

[VMI77]

Bottom line as I see it: When HL&P generated power and sent it to HL&P customers over HL&P transmission lines and I paid my bill to HL&P, there were no issues and the service was great.

That's the way many of us in the industry see it too --at least those of us who work on the reliability side --and some of us fully expect to see continued reductions in reliability, both as a result of the "market" design, and increasing Federal regulatory interference, ironically, in the name of "reliability" (and I say "name" because it's a reliability charade).

Are there any statistics on the deterioration of reliability or have they managed to mangle the way data is collected badly enough under the ERCOT structure that a before/after reliability comparison is impossible? I thought that Texas was pretty much on its own grid. How do the Feds play in the this game? I was ready to blame it all on Texas mismanagement.

I had some first hand experience with one of the power providers. They maintained a very large call center at the time whose major mission seemed to be dealing with their own customers who had been inaccurately disconnected because the billing system couldn't keep account payments straight. It is one thing to loose power under emergency conditions and wholly another thing to have someone yank the meter out of my house when I had paid all my bills on time but they couldn't post them to my account correctly. I cannot imagine how the Feds would be involved in that but what do I know?

I don't think the statistics would show any significant reduction in reliability at this point, but they might --they're just hard to obtain. One of the problems is the difference between transmission (69 kV and above), generation, and distribution (below 69 kV --generally 7.2 to 12.5 kV) reliability. Most outages are on the distribution system, for one reason, because there is a lot more of it.

ERCOT is separate from the rest of the nation, and I'd argue that it is probably the most reliable system in the country --but I may be biased. Still, when the NSA was looking for sites to build their huge data warehouse they picked San Antonio and gave reliability, and the fact that ERCOT is separate from the rest of the country, as a reason. The system has been fairly robust because of the way it was designed and operated, but the built-in margins are being reduced, and we're just beginning a regulatory trend that may lead to reduced reliability.

The other side of the problem is the design of the so called "deregulated" market. The market is profit driven and sometimes a decision to maximize profits leads to a reduction in reliability. This gets pretty complicated, and I'd have to write a whole multi-page essay to explain it, but it may have played a role in the rolling blackouts. For example, as I understand it, 60 generators, with about 8,000 MW of capacity were out of service when the storm arrived. Even in the media you read that many of these generators didn't winterize. They didn't winterize because they made a decision that it was worth the risk of not generating to save the expense of winterizing. I've heard some things that border on nefarious too but I'm a little reluctant to state them publicly at this point. Let me just say that the market design comes with incentives to cheat. I can tell you about other aspects of the market that you would no doubt find completely outrageous. Some of these things are unintended consequences and they're being cleaned up, but others are intentional aspects of the design.

How do the Feds get involved? FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) gives orders to NERC (North American Electric Reliability Corporation), and NERC is the quasi-governmental agency with the legal authority to enforce reliability regulations. FERC is increasingly dominating NERC. NERC is increasingly dominating the industry. 10 years ago NERC was a minor irritant with reliability rules that, for the most part, were common sense --probably didn't even take up 1% of my time. Today complying with the rules of the NERC bureaucracy easily takes up 25% of my time. Sometimes, such as during an audit period, NERC requirements can take 100% of the time of several people in our organization for weeks at a time. Companies have hired people solely to deal with NERC rules. NERC compliance consumes an incredible amount of resources.

Here's the thing: NERC doesn't care about reliability, and so apparently, neither does FERC. It's all about appearances. NERC is an onerous and gigantic paperwork bureaucracy that has nothing to do with actual reliability. Fundamentally, if a company was 100% reliable by whatever measure, but didn't have their paperwork in order, they'd be in violation of NERC and get fined (an audit btw only looks at your paperwork, not your actual reliability). OTOH, a company that is 80% reliable and has all their paperwork in order will pass their NERC audit with flying colors.

Right now the administration of the system is somewhat tolerable because the auditors here were basically split off from ERCOT, and they understand the ERCOT system and apply common sense and reason to their judgments during their audits. Of course, that doesn't mean they aren't responsible for enforcing a lot of onerous and silly rules that not only have nothing to do with reliability, but are actually counterproductive. They are counterproductive in a number of ways, but the most immediate way is they divert resources away from actually planning, designing, and operating the system to satisfying a paperwork bureaucracy.

[sugar land dave]

Our power has been out twice this morning. I sure hoped that turning off my heat twice, for 45 minutes each time, helped out the power grid situation.

I wonder when Cowboy Stadium will be taken down?

I read online that the stadium is exempt from the black out. Go figure...

Of course! The Superbowl must go on.

[Barbi Q]

How do the Feds get involved? FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) gives orders to NERC (North American Electric Reliability Corporation), and NERC is the quasi-governmental agency with the legal authority to enforce reliability regulations. FERC is increasingly dominating NERC. NERC is increasingly dominating the industry. 10 years ago NERC was a minor irritant with reliability rules that, for the most part, were common sense --probably didn't even take up 1% of my time. Today complying with the rules of the NERC bureaucracy easily takes up 25% of my time. Sometimes, such as during an audit period, NERC requirements can take 100% of the time of several people in our organization for weeks at a time. Companies have hired people solely to deal with NERC rules. NERC compliance consumes an incredible amount of resources.

Here's the thing: NERC doesn't care about reliability, and so apparently, neither does FERC. It's all about appearances. NERC is an onerous and gigantic paperwork bureaucracy that has nothing to do with actual reliability. Fundamentally, if a company was 100% reliable by whatever measure, but didn't have their paperwork in order, they'd be in violation of NERC and get fined (an audit btw only looks at your paperwork, not your actual reliability). OTOH, a company that is 80% reliable and has all their paperwork in order will pass their NERC audit with flying colors.

Right now the administration of the system is somewhat tolerable because the auditors here were basically split off from ERCOT, and they understand the ERCOT system and apply common sense and reason to their judgments during their audits. Of course, that doesn't mean they aren't responsible for enforcing a lot of onerous and silly rules that not only have nothing to do with reliability, but are actually counterproductive. They are counterproductive in a number of ways, but the most immediate way is they divert resources away from actually planning, designing, and operating the system to satisfying a paperwork bureaucracy.

That sounds like OVERregulation not DEregulation.

[Mr.ViperBoa]

My wife told me her office was in the dark twice so far today as well as several traffic lights on the way to work.
I don't know if it's related to the black outs or not.

I noticed the traffic lights were out on my way to work except the ones with red light cameras, and those were the hardest ones to stop at with all the ice. How convenient.

[WildBill]

My wife told me her office was in the dark twice so far today as well as several traffic lights on the way to work.
I don't know if it's related to the black outs or not.

I noticed the traffic lights were out on my way to work except the ones with red light cameras, and those were the hardest ones to stop at with all the ice. How convenient.

Interesting observation. I wonder why?

[Mike1951]

My wife told me her office was in the dark twice so far today as well as several traffic lights on the way to work.
I don't know if it's related to the black outs or not.

I noticed the traffic lights were out on my way to work except the ones with red light cameras, and those were the hardest ones to stop at with all the ice. How convenient.

Interesting observation. I wonder why?

Just speculating, of course. If something is revenue generating, it is more likely to have a backup power supply, either solar, battery, or both.

[cbr600]

deleted

[KD5NRH]

The part that bugs me is the "punish the whole class" approach of blacking out entire areas, rather than something more like cities do during water shortages; define, seek out, and penalize egregious wastes when supply issues are expected. Require businesses to shut down accent and landscape lighting that doesn't contribute to safety during a shortage period. Require businesses that are closed or minimally staffed during the shortage to adjust thermostats appropriately and turn off excess lights. (I wonder how many megawatt hours were wasted because some closed businesses couldn't be bothered to have maintenance go in - or IT log in from home - and turn the thermostat down to 45 or 50 instead of heating millions of cubic feet of office or retail space to 75.) I have a $14 thermostat that can be put in "away" mode with one flip of a switch, keeping the temp between 45 and 85 so the pipes don't freeze and the decorative candles don't melt; I don't see any reason that requiring an equivalent capability of a business would be a severe hardship. (Barring, of course, places where a narrower temperature range is legitimately necessary.)

Considering the disparity between electric use of residential vs commercial and industrial properties, and the number of the latter that were closed due to the latter, I have to think that the rolling blackouts could have been entirely prevented with a targeted waste reduction approach.

[VMI77]

One of the things that puzzled me when I moved to Texas is my cost per kwh is higher here (with putative competition) than it was in NC under a regulated utility.

It's a deliberate result of elements of the "market" design." One part of it is that "deregulation" entails creating a "market," and the way that is done is to create an artificial construct called "congestion," that everyone pays for. Pre deregulation congestion was real --it meant some part of the system was overloaded and generation (which was owned by the same companies that owned the grid) was adjusted to eliminate the overload --generators made back their costs on a fixed rate based on a return on capital authorized by the PUCT. Under the current system the transmission companies divested their generation and congestion is imaginary, by which I mean that nothing actually overloads before money is paid: congestion costs are paid based on a calculation that "if" some element should fail then another element would be overloaded.

The actual market is pretty complicated but another aspect is the way generation is priced. We have a clearing price system that allows generators to transfer most of their financial risk to the consumer. Basically, generators don't get paid what they bid for their power (that would be an as-bid system) they get paid for all their generation at the highest price paid for the last MW used.

The current system also allows naked speculation by financial firms like J.P. Morgan and Deutche Bank. In sum, the market design is all in the direction of increasing pressure on prices. To the extent generation prices have gone down it is almost entirely due to a reduction in the price for natural gas. In fact, the market is designed to produce "scarcity pricing" as an incentive to attract new generation into the state. Think about the logic of that for awhile as a long term strategy.

Texas used to have some of the cheapest rates in the country. Now we're in the top half of the country for electric rates. What's more, the cheapest rates in the state are in areas least affected by "deregulation" --the City of Austin, for example, which as a municipal is allowed to own their own generation so they don't have to go out and buy power on the market. Rate comparisons are hard to make because it's hard to get the most recent data, but generally speaking, rates are less, nationwide, in those places that are still regulated or less "deregulated." There is no real competition. The term "deregulation" is just cover for a complex system that was designed to extract more revenue from consumers.

[VMI77]

The part that bugs me is the "punish the whole class" approach of blacking out entire areas, rather than something more like cities do during water shortages; define, seek out, and penalize egregious wastes when supply issues are expected. Require businesses to shut down accent and landscape lighting that doesn't contribute to safety during a shortage period. Require businesses that are closed or minimally staffed during the shortage to adjust thermostats appropriately and turn off excess lights. (I wonder how many megawatt hours were wasted because some closed businesses couldn't be bothered to have maintenance go in - or IT log in from home - and turn the thermostat down to 45 or 50 instead of heating millions of cubic feet of office or retail space to 75.) I have a $14 thermostat that can be put in "away" mode with one flip of a switch, keeping the temp between 45 and 85 so the pipes don't freeze and the decorative candles don't melt; I don't see any reason that requiring an equivalent capability of a business would be a severe hardship. (Barring, of course, places where a narrower temperature range is legitimately necessary.)

Considering the disparity between electric use of residential vs commercial and industrial properties, and the number of the latter that were closed due to the latter, I have to think that the rolling blackouts could have been entirely prevented with a targeted waste reduction approach.

I can assure you, the rolling blackouts cannot have been averted by targeted waste reduction. The power system is not analogous to the water system. The basic difference is that water can be stored, electricity on the scale we're talking about, cannot. The blackouts are the product of a simple physical reality ---load and generation must remain in balance instantaneously, if they don't the whole system goes dark. If someone defies a restriction and uses too much water the system doesn't collapse.

Also, electric utilities have no power to require anyone to use less electricity. How would such restrictions be enforced? Is some group of officials going to go around checking everyone's thermostat? A water meter tells you how much water is used, an electric meter doesn't tell you what your thermostat was set at. You want people to have to report their thermostat settings to the government? Who gets to decide which businesses are guilty of waste and which ones are important enough to keep operating? Who gets to decide when "narrower temperature range" is "legitimately necessary?"