More opinions by some in the know:
whskee
January 13, 2016 at 18:00
It’s embarrassing as heck. This is a Riverine Command Boat (RCB). It shouldn’t really be out in open ocean being a river boat based on the Swedish CB-90. The MK VI Patrol Boat is set to replace them for that role.
It is typically armed with a Mk 49 ROSAM (M2HB), and 4 crew served mounts which can be a mix of Mk 44 Miniguns, M240’s, or M2HB’s. Mk 19 AGL’s are in inventory but not typically in play. The boat can fight, if they make the choice to fight. It is an armored platform. Most of their people are not from the old Riverine Squadrons, and it shows. Their training has taken a severe degradation. Real Riverines have been getting axed since the merger of Mobile Security Squadrons, who are basically harbor patrol and very much not combat minded culturally. They make a lot of stupid mistakes and don’t take those mistakes seriously, hence, why this stuff happens.
These guys made a lot of really dumb mistakes that led to them being behind the lines they should have been. An unintentional incursion will only be made way worse by lighting off the guns at that point. Resist capture absolutely, but understand the repercussions are severe when you are in the wrong to begin with. If they would have done the things that basic Riverines of just a few years ago were trained to do, this never would have happened. They just gave the force a black eye. I’d be surprised if they continue the mission they were there to do.
Reply ↓
Eric
January 13, 2016 at 22:03
+1 ^
Totally concur and only have a few things to add. You nailed it.
1) These guys just failed basic seamanship and the biggest travesty here will be if every single one of them doesn’t have their quals pulled. They shouldn’t have even been that far out with those platforms combined with the shocking evidence of low standards/lack of training. Ok, so GPS failed – on BOTH boats? What about the paper chart? My watch has a GPS, and I have a handheld in my boat bag. Plain and simple, the coxswain a lost SA of their position, most likely because their experience base is visual nav within sight of the coast. Long nav runs out of sight of land are generally a SWCC skill set in my experience and not practiced to providence in Navy NCW.
2) ROE in re Iran as far back as 2003 in Naval Coast Warfare Group One was to “take cover and call higher for guidance”. Armed Iranian boats were not uncommon near the GOPLATS. 3 guys were killed in early 2004 by a suicide boat, but chain of command was ALWAYS more worried about firing too quickly than they were about not firing quickly enough. This isn’t unique to NCW, it’s a Surface Warfare culture problem that stems from the concept of how you “fight” a ship – the individual sailor isn’t a fighting unit. His job is to operate the weapon while the CIC tells him where to point it and when to pull the trigger. Also, keep in mind that Achievement Medals have been awarded to junior sailors in that AOR who didn’t open fire when the ROE clearly indicated that they should have, but imperiled themselves and their ships waiting for higher to decide not to shoot for diplomatic reasons. The word is generally out – if you don’t shoot and get blown up you’re a hero, but if you shoot and are wrong (based on things you couldn’t have known at the time) the CoC will hang you out.
3) To our eternal shame, the whole reason the USN has this mission at all is because the USCG was too risk averse after losing Nate Bruckenthal in the KABOT bombing & waved off, in my opinion.
4) Given all of the above, I’m surprised that they had ammo or weapons at all. They were reportedly doing a boat swap between Kuwait & Bahrain. The basic load of ammo in NCW is probably 10% of what NSW would have on the same boat. At kickoff in OIF we were handed 3-30 round magazines and 90 rounds each by NCW. It’s a cultural problem with the fleet Navy that’s never going away.
