Brackenridge Hospital Austin 30.06

[Keith B]

No. you are misreading the law. The term effective notice is specifically defined in the one paragraph (b). Paragraph (e) is how to apply the section of the law, and does not affect the definition carried in paragraph (b).

Note that paragraph (b) says you are given notice when you are given the oral or written communication. Paragraph (c) then defines the communication, but the notice itself is already defined. Paragraph (d) then tells you what grade of offense. It does not affect any of the other paragraphs either.

So, the effective notice definition is the part referred to by paragraph (i) in section 46.035. You receive the effective notice when the sign is properly posted. Then you get charged with violating 46.035 and not 30.06.

The fun part is that if it were a private hospital, you could get charged with both violations for carrying past the same sign.

I respectfully disagree. 2 Parts.

First, regarding your application of (e) to the rest of the statute.
Section (e) pertains to the entirety of 30.06. It specifically states it is an exception to the 'application of this section', eg, everything between the § (section) symbols, eg all of 30.06.
So (b) is excepted if (e) is met. Which means, there is no longer any definition that meets 'effective notice' under that section. The application of the Text as defined in (b) is excepted/no longer construes/can no longer be applied as 'effective notice'. Noting the circular logic above, in order for one to affect the other, one has to be true at one point in time for the logic to return true. If A, than B, and If B, than A, will not return true if neither B nor A are never true.

Then to 46.035 only referring to the 'definition' of 'effective notice'
I agree that 'effective notice' is defined under (b), however, 46.035 does not say 'effective notice As Defined in 30.06', but rather, 'effective notice Under 30.06'. This means that 30.06 has to apply, on it's standalone, before it can be applied to 46.035. You yourself have said that 30.06 will not apply on it's own, so therefore, since they were not given 'effective notice under 30.06', it does not apply.

At least this is my opinion.
How a judge or a jury would see it could be completely different from both of our interpretations

Well, no disrespect, but I personally will go with srothstein's view due to his extensive law enforcement and LEO instructor background. I personally trust his opinion/interpretation as the most accurate and what would likely transpire.

[dicion]

Well, no disrespect, but I personally will go with srothstein's view due to his extensive law enforcement and LEO instructor background. I personally trust his opinion/interpretation as the most accurate and what would likely transpire.

That's fine I have no argument with differences of opinion, as I said, a judge or jury could go somewhere else completely with it
Would I like to see the result of a court case on this? Sure! Would I want to BE the court case on this? Heck no!

However, in my personal opinion, I Would carry at this location.
Concealed is Concealed, Better to be judged by 12 than carried by 6, all that Mumbo Jumbo

[03Lightningrocks]

No. you are misreading the law. The term effective notice is specifically defined in the one paragraph (b). Paragraph (e) is how to apply the section of the law, and does not affect the definition carried in paragraph (b).

Note that paragraph (b) says you are given notice when you are given the oral or written communication. Paragraph (c) then defines the communication, but the notice itself is already defined. Paragraph (d) then tells you what grade of offense. It does not affect any of the other paragraphs either.

So, the effective notice definition is the part referred to by paragraph (i) in section 46.035. You receive the effective notice when the sign is properly posted. Then you get charged with violating 46.035 and not 30.06.

The fun part is that if it were a private hospital, you could get charged with both violations for carrying past the same sign.

I respectfully disagree. 2 Parts.

First, regarding your application of (e) to the rest of the statute.
Section (e) pertains to the entirety of 30.06. It specifically states it is an exception to the 'application of this section', eg, everything between the § (section) symbols, eg all of 30.06.
So (b) is excepted if (e) is met. Which means, there is no longer any definition that meets 'effective notice' under that section. The application of the Text as defined in (b) is excepted/no longer construes/can no longer be applied as 'effective notice'. Noting the circular logic above, in order for one to affect the other, one has to be true at one point in time for the logic to return true. If A, than B, and If B, than A, will not return true if neither B nor A are never true.

Then to 46.035 only referring to the 'definition' of 'effective notice'
I agree that 'effective notice' is defined under (b), however, 46.035 does not say 'effective notice As Defined in 30.06', but rather, 'effective notice Under 30.06'. This means that 30.06 has to apply, on it's standalone, before it can be applied to 46.035. You yourself have said that 30.06 will not apply on it's own, so therefore, since they were not given 'effective notice under 30.06', it does not apply.

At least this is my opinion.
How a judge or a jury would see it could be completely different from both of our interpretations

Well, no disrespect, but I personally will go with srothstein's view due to his extensive law enforcement and LEO instructor background. I personally trust his opinion/interpretation as the most accurate and what would likely transpire.

I will add something else to what Kieth says here. Reading Rothstein's take on these things gives us insight on how LEO is going to interpret these situations. Which is what determines if I am going to have to take the ride if I am caught carrying past these signs. I am betting in this situation, I would be going to jail.

[mr.72]

...which makes the point, even LEOs cannot understand the law as it is written. Probably judges cannot either, nor prosecuting attorneys.

So of course we can't expect citizens to understand the law. It can't be made to make sense, so it allows the judge to decide on the law from the bench without any precedent or solid written law.

[Chaz7138]

I asked a criminal defense attorney, who's firm defends CHL holders & Instructors, here are their comments:
"Texas Penal Code 30.06(e) which states that property owned or leased by a governmental entity cannot have 30.06 signs posted. Since the property is leased by the hospital, they have “control” over the premises. That means they may post a 30.06 sign without regard to 30.06(e). If you keep reading 30.06(e), it states ...”and is not a premises or other place on which the license holder is prohibited from carrying a handgun under Section 46.03 and 46.035.” A hospital is specifically listed in 46.035(b)(4)."

Therefore under PC46.035 a hospital is specifically listed as a prohibited place and can post a PC30.06 sign regardless of ownership!!

Additionally I found that in 2003 the 5th floor was leased to University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, which is part of the University of Texas System and therefore the 5th floor would also be a prohibited place under PC46.03(a)(1); and PC46.03(g)states "An offense under this section is a third degree felony."

[sjfcontrol]

I asked a criminal defense attorney, who's firm defends CHL holders & Instructors, here are their comments:
"Texas Penal Code 30.06(e) which states that property owned or leased by a governmental entity cannot have 30.06 signs posted. Since the property is leased by the hospital, they have “control” over the premises. That means they may post a 30.06 sign without regard to 30.06(e). If you keep reading 30.06(e), it states ...”and is not a premises or other place on which the license holder is prohibited from carrying a handgun under Section 46.03 and 46.035.” A hospital is specifically listed in 46.035(b)(4)."

Therefore under PC46.035 a hospital is specifically listed as a prohibited place and can post a PC30.06 sign regardless of ownership!!

Additionally I found that in 2003 the 5th floor was leased to University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, which is part of the University of Texas System and therefore the 5th floor would also be a prohibited place under PC46.03(a)(1); and PC46.03(g)states "An offense under this section is a third degree felony."

That doesn't sound right. Just because the lessee has control of the property does not invalidate the "owned by a government entity" part. They still own it. And Mr. Cotton has pointed out that the landlord cannot convey a right to the lessee that the landlord himself does not possess. For example, if I owned a piece of property that I did NOT have mineral rights to, I could not rent that property to a mining company and claim that they were extracting the minerals, not me.

Also, it would seem this is the same issue that was resolved regarding the leasing of Fair Park (owned by the city of Dallas) to the people that run the Texas State Fair. They (the lessee) originally were posting 30.06, but were forced to stop and allow CHLs to carry because it's city property.

[sjfcontrol]

And I just noticed -- Welcome to the Forum, Chaz7138!

[TexasTornado]

I have another view point question on this.

If you're admitted to the hospital then what about the castle doctrine? Your room, much like a hotel room becomes your temporary living quarters. Would you then be carrying under the authority of 30.06 and if not is 40.035 listed as an exception to the castle doctrine at all?

[Charles L. Cotton]

I have another view point question on this.

If you're admitted to the hospital then what about the castle doctrine? Your room, much like a hotel room becomes your temporary living quarters. Would you then be carrying under the authority of 30.06 and if not is 40.035 listed as an exception to the castle doctrine at all?

Your "living quarters" is not a controlling factor. Your hospital room is not your "own premises or premises under [your] control" as we see in Tex. Penal Code §46.02(a)(1). Therefore, it would be unlawful for you to possess a handgun in your hospital room unless you have an LTC. Since you would be carrying pursuant to the authority of your LTC, Tex. Panel Code §46.035(b)(4) would apply. Since the hospital posted a TPC §30.06 sign to trigger the prohibition found in TPC §46.035(b)(4), you would be in violation of that Code provision.

Unlike a hotel room, you do not have any control over your hospital room, nor to you have any expectation of privacy.

Chas.

[TexasTornado]

I have another view point question on this.

If you're admitted to the hospital then what about the castle doctrine? Your room, much like a hotel room becomes your temporary living quarters. Would you then be carrying under the authority of 30.06 and if not is 40.035 listed as an exception to the castle doctrine at all?

Your "living quarters" is not a controlling factor. Your hospital room is not your "own premises or premises under [your] control" as we see in Tex. Penal Code §46.02(a)(1). Therefore, it would be unlawful for you to possess a handgun in your hospital room unless you have an LTC. Since you would be carrying pursuant to the authority of your LTC, Tex. Panel Code §46.035(b)(4) would apply. Since the hospital posted a TPC §30.06 sign to trigger the prohibition found in TPC §46.035(b)(4), you would be in violation of that Code provision.

Unlike a hotel room, you do not have any control over your hospital room, nor to you have any expectation of privacy.

Chas.

That makes sense, but please God don't tell any woman in labor and delivery she doesn't have control over her domain. In my experience, you may not live to tell the tale armed or not ;)

[AJSully421]

In 2017, 46.035 should be removed entirely, and 46.03 should include "it is an exception to the application of this section that the actor possessed a handgun, and is licensed to carry a handgun openly or concealed, except in a correctional facility, courtroom while court is in session, or a secured area of an airport."

[mr1337]

In 2017, 46.035 should be removed entirely, and 46.03 should include "it is an exception to the application of this section that the actor possessed a handgun, and is licensed to carry a handgun openly or concealed, except in a correctional facility, courtroom while court is in session, or a secured area of an airport."

I think we can all agree on that.

[MeMelYup]

In 2017, 46.035 should be removed entirely, and 46.03 should include "it is an exception to the application of this section that the actor possessed a handgun, and is licensed to carry a handgun openly or concealed, except in a correctional facility, courtroom while court is in session, or a secured area of an airport."

Like.