"School Sponsored" scope....

[ralewis]

I cannot find it right now, but Charles has gone into this at length before. If I remember his explanation correctly, he explains that it can only apply to places where the school has control of the property to begin with. Much as the example given about the office building, consider a zoo or museum. If they allowed me in while legally carrying, and then the school shows up in a class trip, I am all of a sudden breaking the law under any other interpretation of this. How do I even get out of the zoo to put it in the car without breaking the law? The law can never be interpreted to be nonsensical.

Were you thinking of this: SB 394 by Creighton - Clarification of School Activity Grounds (2017)

As far as I know - this one died after being reported out of the House Committee. A similar bill (HB1009) was filed in the House in 2019, but never even received a hearing.

ETA: There was a companion bill in the Senate (SB117) that also made it to the House Criminal Jurisprudence Committee headed by Democrat Nicole Collier during the 2019-2020 legislative session. This seems to be another great bill that died due to the feckless leadership of Speaker Bonnen appointing Democrats as heads of significant committees.

My interest in creating this threat was twofold really. First, this is one of the areas that needs some clarification. it' creates a lot of angst among new licensees. In all reality it's probably unlikely that you'd ever be prosecuted even given the most aggressive interpretation of a school sponsored activity. I know i've never heard of it happening.

Second and more importantly... I think this is an area that is taught inconsistently in the LTC course. There should be no room for interpretation on the part of the instructors when it comes to off limits locations. In this specific case a friend of mine was told specifically he HAD to vacate the premises of a Whataburger if a high school volleyball team stopped for lunch there.

I appreciate everyone's responses, but it confirms my original belief that this is not as crystal clear as it should be.

[KC5AV]

I believe you are correct that it’s taught inconsistently. I’ve heard it brought the up more than once at instructor renewal, and the folks from legal will never commit on whether it’s legal or not. Since they legal won’t commit, I suspect that many instructors end up teaching their particular interpretation of the law as fact.

[ELB]

I cannot find it right now, but Charles has gone into this at length before. ...

I went to Charles Cotton's posts and searched for "school sponsored activity." I found a couple threads from 2010 or so where he explains his logic, but he also notes that this is, to borrow his phrase, "Cotton Law" not state law, or based on any court case. It also appears he either wrote or promoted a couple bills to explicitly sort this out, but it seems they did not pass. There are more posts where he notes that (in my words) if the school does not own the grounds where the activity takes place, then it is not a "school sponsored activity" for the purposes of licensed carry.

There may be other more recent posts where he explains the logic, but I didn't see them. However I didn't spend a lot time searching for them, I just skimmed the search results.

viewtopic.php?f=7&t=25333&p=287208&hili ... ty#p287208

Caveat: There is no case law on this issue.

This issue comes up periodically. As noted, there is no case law on the issue of whether school sponsored activities conducted off-campus render such locations off limits to CHLs. However, it is my opinion that TPC §46.03(a)(1) makes it clear that the "grounds" or "building[s]" where the school sponsored activities are conducted must be owned by the school. There are at least two justifications for this position. First, everything in §46.03(a)(1) deals with school property. This is shown by the phrase "of a school or educational institution" and by reference to "a passenger transportation vehicle of a school or educational institution." If a teacher put her class on a city buss to go to the library, the activity would be school sponsored, but the buss would not be "a passenger transportation vehicle of a school," thus it would not be off limits to CHLs.

More importantly, all of the prohibitions can be waived by a school, as evidenced by the provision "unless pursuant to written regulation or written authorization of the institution." Schools clearly do not have the authority to authorize the carrying of firearms on property they do not own, so they would not be able to authorize anyone to carry a gun into a public library. Nor would a school have the authority to allow someone to carry a gun into a private restaurant, if the school sponsored activity included lunch at such a location. The only way this closing phrase can be meaningful is by reading §46.03(a)(1) to apply only to property owned by the school. The rules of statutory construction require that statutes be read in such as way as to give meaning to every provision, unless this is impossible. Every provision in TPC §46.03(a)(1) can be harmonized, but only by applying it solely to property owned by the school.

Chas.

Sec. 46.03.AAPLACES WEAPONS PROHIBITED. (a) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly possesses or goes with a firearm, illegal knife, club, or prohibited weapon listed in Section 46.05(a):

(1) on the physical premises of a school or educational institution, any grounds or building on which an
activity sponsored by a school or educational institution is being conducted, or a passenger transportation vehicle of a school or educational institution, whether the school or educational institution is public or private, unless pursuant to written regulations or written authorization of the institution;

viewtopic.php?f=7&t=15587&p=177070&hili ... ty#p177070

As others have mentioned, there is some dispute on what constitutes "grounds." I believe the statute taken as a whole indicates the activity has to be occurring on grounds owned by the school, as all of TPC §46.02(a) deals with schools. The buildings are school buildings, the transportation vehicles are the schools'. (If school children ride a city buss to the zoo, the bus would not be off limits to CHLs because the buss is not "a transportation vehicle of the school, . . .") Further, the statute allows the carrying of firearms in such places, with "written authorization" of the institution. It would be quite a stretch to presume that the Legislature intended the school to have the authority to authorize the carrying of firearms on someone else's property. When read in its entirety, as we are required to do, I believe TPC §46.02(a) applies only to school property and school vehicles.

But as noted, this is a gray area; the cutting edge of the law where many people find themselves bleeding to death.

Chas.

§ 46.03. PLACES WEAPONS PROHIBITED. (a) A person
commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly possesses or goes with a firearm, illegal knife, club,
or prohibited weapon listed in Section 46.05(a):
(1) on the physical premises of a school or
educational institution, any grounds or building on which an
activity sponsored by a school or educational institution is being
conducted, or a passenger transportation vehicle of a school or
educational institution, whether the school or educational
institution is public or private, unless pursuant to written
regulations or written authorization of the institution;

viewtopic.php?f=7&t=38722&p=462625&hili ... ty#p462625

But its harder to argue under PC 46.03. I think this language is a bit broad. I've seen the highschool cross-country team running in a long line down the streets and sidewalks around our neighborhood. Is it really the intent of the legislature to say weapons are now not allowed in my neighborhood because of a definition that includes any activity sponsored by a school?

PC §46.03. PLACES WEAPONS PROHIBITED. (a) A person commits
an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly possesses
or goes with a firearm, illegal knife, club, or prohibited weapon
listed in Section 46.05(a):
(1) on the physical premises of a school or educational institution,
any grounds or building on which an activity sponsored by a school or
educational institution is being conducted, or a passenger transportation
vehicle of a school or educational institution, whether the school or
educational institution is public or private, unless pursuant to written
regulations or written authorization of the institution;

There is no case law on point.

That said, I believe it is clear that the activity grounds must be school property. You cannot read any part of a statute out of context and the phrase "any grounds or building on which . . ." appears in a sentence that clearly refers to school property. Further evidence is the provision that allows a school to authorize the carrying of firearms in such places and schools would have such authority only on property it owns.

Chas.

There a few other posts where he summarizes his opinion, but I don't believe they add anything that's not already covered above.

I find only one Texas Attorney General opinion (KP-0050) addressing "school sponsored activities" where he was asked a question about how the 30.07 provision applies to schools. His summary includes the following statements:

The question whether, and where on school grounds, a school-sponsored activity is
occurring involves the resolution of fact questions that are beyond the purview of an attorney
general opinion. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0827 (2010) at 2 ("This office does not determine
questions of fact in an attorney general opinion .... "). For instance, if a high school utilizes a
school parking lot for a band rehearsal, that parking lot would likely fall within the scope of
subsection 46.03(a)(l), prohibiting weapons during the time of the rehearsal. Yet, the other
parking areas at the school where school activities are not occurring would not fall within
subsection 46.03(a)(l) and would not be places where weapons are prohibited. See Tex. Att'y
Gen. Op. No. DM-363 (1995) at 4 (recognizing that a concern before the Legislature in excluding
parking lots and other similar areas from "premises" was to make it not a crime for a person with
a concealed handgun to drive into the driveway of a place where handguns were prohibited).

...

Subsection 46.03(a)(l) of the Penal Code prohibits
handguns from places on which a school-sponsored activity is
occurring, which places can include grounds otherwise excluded
from the definition of "premises" such as public or private
driveways, streets, sidewalks or walkways, parking lots, parking
garages, or other parking areas.

https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/si ... kp0050.pdf

I believe in the context of that opinion the driveways, streets, sidewalk or walkways, parking lots, parking garages, or other parking areas that he refers to are school-owned. However he does not address the issue of a school activity on non-school-owned ground.

Now the fact that this issue has never come up in case law is encouraging, but I would NOT be tempted to push the issue in certain jurisdictions. However persuasive one might find the above logic, the DA decides what the law is and acts on it, and it's up to you to prove her wrong. Particularly if the coming election goes the wrong way, I expect to see dramatic pushback on gun rights from the Soros-bought DAs and fellow travelers across the country, knowing even if they are ultimately unsuccessful that the process is the punishment.

[LDB415]

It's all too complicated. I have a friend who goes on the theory the only prohibited places are those requiring walking through metal detectors and those requiring disrobing (doctors). Everywhere else, he isn't wearing (choose whatever color you want for discussion) underwear and he isn't carrying because, well, concealed.

[RoyGBiv]

I went to Charles Cotton's posts and searched for "school sponsored activity." I found a couple threads from 2010 or so where he explains his logic, but he also notes that this is, to borrow his phrase, "Cotton Law" not state law, or based on any court case.

Just wanted to say THANKS for finding all that. I did some searching but was not successful in finding anything other than KP-050 which I didn't think answered the question sufficiently. I should have thought to search Charles posts....

Anyway... Thanks.!

[Charles L. Cotton]

I cannot find it right now, but Charles has gone into this at length before. ...

I went to Charles Cotton's posts and searched for "school sponsored activity." I found a couple threads from 2010 or so where he explains his logic, but he also notes that this is, to borrow his phrase, "Cotton Law" not state law, or based on any court case. It also appears he either wrote or promoted a couple bills to explicitly sort this out, but it seems they did not pass. There are more posts where he notes that (in my words) if the school does not own the grounds where the activity takes place, then it is not a "school sponsored activity" for the purposes of licensed carry.

There may be other more recent posts where he explains the logic, but I didn't see them. However I didn't spend a lot time searching for them, I just skimmed the search results.

viewtopic.php?f=7&t=25333&p=287208&hili ... ty#p287208

Caveat: There is no case law on this issue.

This issue comes up periodically. As noted, there is no case law on the issue of whether school sponsored activities conducted off-campus render such locations off limits to CHLs. However, it is my opinion that TPC §46.03(a)(1) makes it clear that the "grounds" or "building[s]" where the school sponsored activities are conducted must be owned by the school. There are at least two justifications for this position. First, everything in §46.03(a)(1) deals with school property. This is shown by the phrase "of a school or educational institution" and by reference to "a passenger transportation vehicle of a school or educational institution." If a teacher put her class on a city buss to go to the library, the activity would be school sponsored, but the buss would not be "a passenger transportation vehicle of a school," thus it would not be off limits to CHLs.

More importantly, all of the prohibitions can be waived by a school, as evidenced by the provision "unless pursuant to written regulation or written authorization of the institution." Schools clearly do not have the authority to authorize the carrying of firearms on property they do not own, so they would not be able to authorize anyone to carry a gun into a public library. Nor would a school have the authority to allow someone to carry a gun into a private restaurant, if the school sponsored activity included lunch at such a location. The only way this closing phrase can be meaningful is by reading §46.03(a)(1) to apply only to property owned by the school. The rules of statutory construction require that statutes be read in such as way as to give meaning to every provision, unless this is impossible. Every provision in TPC §46.03(a)(1) can be harmonized, but only by applying it solely to property owned by the school.

Chas.

Sec. 46.03.AAPLACES WEAPONS PROHIBITED. (a) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly possesses or goes with a firearm, illegal knife, club, or prohibited weapon listed in Section 46.05(a):

(1) on the physical premises of a school or educational institution, any grounds or building on which an
activity sponsored by a school or educational institution is being conducted, or a passenger transportation vehicle of a school or educational institution, whether the school or educational institution is public or private, unless pursuant to written regulations or written authorization of the institution;

viewtopic.php?f=7&t=15587&p=177070&hili ... ty#p177070

As others have mentioned, there is some dispute on what constitutes "grounds." I believe the statute taken as a whole indicates the activity has to be occurring on grounds owned by the school, as all of TPC §46.02(a) deals with schools. The buildings are school buildings, the transportation vehicles are the schools'. (If school children ride a city buss to the zoo, the bus would not be off limits to CHLs because the buss is not "a transportation vehicle of the school, . . .") Further, the statute allows the carrying of firearms in such places, with "written authorization" of the institution. It would be quite a stretch to presume that the Legislature intended the school to have the authority to authorize the carrying of firearms on someone else's property. When read in its entirety, as we are required to do, I believe TPC §46.02(a) applies only to school property and school vehicles.

But as noted, this is a gray area; the cutting edge of the law where many people find themselves bleeding to death.

Chas.

§ 46.03. PLACES WEAPONS PROHIBITED. (a) A person
commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly possesses or goes with a firearm, illegal knife, club,
or prohibited weapon listed in Section 46.05(a):
(1) on the physical premises of a school or
educational institution, any grounds or building on which an
activity sponsored by a school or educational institution is being
conducted, or a passenger transportation vehicle of a school or
educational institution, whether the school or educational
institution is public or private, unless pursuant to written
regulations or written authorization of the institution;

viewtopic.php?f=7&t=38722&p=462625&hili ... ty#p462625

But its harder to argue under PC 46.03. I think this language is a bit broad. I've seen the highschool cross-country team running in a long line down the streets and sidewalks around our neighborhood. Is it really the intent of the legislature to say weapons are now not allowed in my neighborhood because of a definition that includes any activity sponsored by a school?

PC §46.03. PLACES WEAPONS PROHIBITED. (a) A person commits
an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly possesses
or goes with a firearm, illegal knife, club, or prohibited weapon
listed in Section 46.05(a):
(1) on the physical premises of a school or educational institution,
any grounds or building on which an activity sponsored by a school or
educational institution is being conducted, or a passenger transportation
vehicle of a school or educational institution, whether the school or
educational institution is public or private, unless pursuant to written
regulations or written authorization of the institution;

There is no case law on point.

That said, I believe it is clear that the activity grounds must be school property. You cannot read any part of a statute out of context and the phrase "any grounds or building on which . . ." appears in a sentence that clearly refers to school property. Further evidence is the provision that allows a school to authorize the carrying of firearms in such places and schools would have such authority only on property it owns.

Chas.

There a few other posts where he summarizes his opinion, but I don't believe they add anything that's not already covered above.

I find only one Texas Attorney General opinion (KP-0050) addressing "school sponsored activities" where he was asked a question about how the 30.07 provision applies to schools. His summary includes the following statements:

The question whether, and where on school grounds, a school-sponsored activity is
occurring involves the resolution of fact questions that are beyond the purview of an attorney
general opinion. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0827 (2010) at 2 ("This office does not determine
questions of fact in an attorney general opinion .... "). For instance, if a high school utilizes a
school parking lot for a band rehearsal, that parking lot would likely fall within the scope of
subsection 46.03(a)(l), prohibiting weapons during the time of the rehearsal. Yet, the other
parking areas at the school where school activities are not occurring would not fall within
subsection 46.03(a)(l) and would not be places where weapons are prohibited. See Tex. Att'y
Gen. Op. No. DM-363 (1995) at 4 (recognizing that a concern before the Legislature in excluding
parking lots and other similar areas from "premises" was to make it not a crime for a person with
a concealed handgun to drive into the driveway of a place where handguns were prohibited).

...

Subsection 46.03(a)(l) of the Penal Code prohibits
handguns from places on which a school-sponsored activity is
occurring, which places can include grounds otherwise excluded
from the definition of "premises" such as public or private
driveways, streets, sidewalks or walkways, parking lots, parking
garages, or other parking areas.

https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/si ... kp0050.pdf

I believe in the context of that opinion the driveways, streets, sidewalk or walkways, parking lots, parking garages, or other parking areas that he refers to are school-owned. However he does not address the issue of a school activity on non-school-owned ground.

Now the fact that this issue has never come up in case law is encouraging, but I would NOT be tempted to push the issue in certain jurisdictions. However persuasive one might find the above logic, the DA decides what the law is and acts on it, and it's up to you to prove her wrong. Particularly if the coming election goes the wrong way, I expect to see dramatic pushback on gun rights from the Soros-bought DAs and fellow travelers across the country, knowing even if they are ultimately unsuccessful that the process is the punishment.

After the posts you quoted, an AG Opinion was issued that supports my analysis. It dealt with courthouses rather than schools, but the operative language was identical.

The AG opined that the administrative Judge can ban handguns only in the areas of a building the court uses and can control. This was based upon the language in the Code banning handguns in courthouses "unless pursuant to written rules or written authorization." The language and rationale is identical to schools.

I'm in a waiting room typing on my phone. I'll post the AG Opinion in question when I get back home.

Chas.

[ELB]

After the posts you quoted, an AG Opinion was issued that supports my analysis. It dealt with courthouses rather than schools, but the operative language was identical.

The AG opined that the administrative Judge can ban handguns only in the areas of a building the court uses and can control. This was based upon the language in the Code banning handguns in courthouses "unless pursuant to written rules or written authorization." The language and rationale is identical to schools.

I'm in a waiting room typing on my phone. I'll post the AG Opinion in question when I get back home.

Chas.

Ah, good.

I didn't think to look for "parallel" opinions in other areas, I just looked for school sponsored. However, AG's courthouse opinions didn't fly at the trial court level, we shall have to see what the appellate court ruling brings.

[Charles L. Cotton]

After the posts you quoted, an AG Opinion was issued that supports my analysis. It dealt with courthouses rather than schools, but the operative language was identical.

The AG opined that the administrative Judge can ban handguns only in the areas of a building the court uses and can control. This was based upon the language in the Code banning handguns in courthouses "unless pursuant to written rules or written authorization." The language and rationale is identical to schools.

I'm in a waiting room typing on my phone. I'll post the AG Opinion in question when I get back home.

Chas.

Ah, good.

I didn't think to look for "parallel" opinions in other areas, I just looked for school sponsored. However, AG's courthouse opinions didn't fly at the trial court level, we shall have to see what the appellate court ruling brings.

What trial?

Chas.

[Papa_Tiger]

After the posts you quoted, an AG Opinion was issued that supports my analysis. It dealt with courthouses rather than schools, but the operative language was identical.

The AG opined that the administrative Judge can ban handguns only in the areas of a building the court uses and can control. This was based upon the language in the Code banning handguns in courthouses "unless pursuant to written rules or written authorization." The language and rationale is identical to schools.

I'm in a waiting room typing on my phone. I'll post the AG Opinion in question when I get back home.

Chas.

Ah, good.

I didn't think to look for "parallel" opinions in other areas, I just looked for school sponsored. However, AG's courthouse opinions didn't fly at the trial court level, we shall have to see what the appellate court ruling brings.

What trial?

Chas.

Probably referring to the Waller County Courthouse decision:
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/h ... 610368.php

[ELB]

After the posts you quoted, an AG Opinion was issued that supports my analysis. It dealt with courthouses rather than schools, but the operative language was identical.

The AG opined that the administrative Judge can ban handguns only in the areas of a building the court uses and can control. This was based upon the language in the Code banning handguns in courthouses "unless pursuant to written rules or written authorization." The language and rationale is identical to schools.

I'm in a waiting room typing on my phone. I'll post the AG Opinion in question when I get back home.

Chas.

Ah, good.

I didn't think to look for "parallel" opinions in other areas, I just looked for school sponsored. However, AG's courthouse opinions didn't fly at the trial court level, we shall have to see what the appellate court ruling brings.

What trial?

Chas.

Paxton v City of Austin in particular. This is where he made the argument that licensed carry could be prohibited only the court room and court offices, not the entire building. The judge ruled that the ban could be extended to the entire building and it was the city's choice because of the "or' in "premises or portion of premises". (...but interestingly, only when the court is in session). Also the second Waller trial -- not the one against Holcomb, but the one that the AG filed against Waller directly. I haven't seen the court documents in that case, but I assume the AG made similar arguments, that the court only controls the courtroom itself and its associated office, not every office that happens to reside in a court house. But the trial judge did not buy this.