TexasCHLforum.com

anygunanywhere wrote: ↑Fri Aug 06, 2021 5:56 pm Submarine Sonar Technician STS1(SS). I made 9 deterrent patrols.

USS George Bancroft SSBN-643. The second pic is her last surface before decommissioning, an emergency surface from test depth. Over 8,000 tons out of the water.

Her sail is on display outside the King's Bay, Georgia Submarine Base, the memorial dedicated on the 100th anniversary of the US Navy submarine Service.

bobby wrote: ↑Mon Aug 02, 2021 8:36 pm Death from Below. RM2(SS) USS SeaDragon SSN584

I’ll skip to the takeaway here. The U.S. should refrain from fighting the next war because we’ve already lost, long before even one shot has been fired.

The source for this ultra-defeatist news is not just a teacher at a sailor’s college, sited on a salty bay. No, the source is no less than a serving, 4-star general whose job title is Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Let’s dig in…

Here’s the long and short. The U.S. military conducted a major wargame last fall and “it failed miserably,” said U.S. Air Force Gen. John Hyten earlier this week.

anygunanywhere wrote: ↑Mon Aug 02, 2021 4:13 pm

Micromanagement is a term that can be misused. But it is fair to note that the United States Navy has several centuries of sound experience growing warship captains who have been wholly autonomous and independent in commanding their vessels. The ability to communicate instantly with deployed ships is a relatively new development in the Navy’s 245-year history. This is generally unique to surface Navy as submarines still have a more limited and less persistent communications path with higher headquarters and pilots in combat have almost none. The “1000-mile screwdriver” is, for now, a primarily surface warfare officer concern.

Heh heh. Skimmers.

This review was conducted at the direction of Senator Tom Cotton and Congressmen Mike
Gallagher, Jim Banks, and Dan Crenshaw as a strictly nonpartisan exercise in Congressional
oversight. The authors of this review conducted long-form interviews with numerous active-duty
and recently retired or detached officers and enlisted personnel about their insights into the
culture of the United States Navy following a series of high-profile and damaging operational
failures in the Navy’s Surface Warfare community. The discussion below is intended to inform
Congress of the findings of these interviews, with an emphasis on subjects including funding,
maintenance planning, administrative management, and operational employment.

The review did not focus on any single failure, each of which has been thoroughly investigated
by the appropriate authorities, but rather examined the broader question of whether the episodes
taken as a whole indicate any underlying systemic problems affecting the performance of the
surface Navy. The incidents that formed the impetus for this review included the catastrophic fire
on the USS Bonhomme Richard pier-side in San Diego, the collision of the USS McCain in the
South China Sea, the collision of the USS Fitzgerald off the coast of Japan, and the surrender of
two small U.S. Navy craft to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy in the Arabian Gulf.
The direction from members of Congress was to establish if these incidents were part of a series
of isolated, unit-level breakdowns, or if they instead indicate larger institutional issues that are
degrading the performance of the entire naval surface force.